When the time for intercession did come two days later – today the people are praying: “may AWK go to heaven,” one Kandahari mawkishly told me –a “turban bomber” validated their fears with a suicide attack that narrowly missed Karzai’s relatives. The subsequent assassination of President Hamid Karzai’s warlord-cum-advisor Jan Muhammad, from neighboring Uruzgan province, left no doubt that the Popalzai family patronage network is up for replacement.Kandaharis know how the script ends: a trusted guard killed Persian emperor Nadir Shah in 1747, opening the door for the father of Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah, to start a new dynasty in Kandahar. More recently, the Kandahar police chief was killed by a Talib in a police uniform in April, allowing young charismatic police commander General Abdul Razziq to inaugurate a two-month era of relative calm (albeit a tradeoff for opium-smuggling lenience). No wonder that, after Ahmad Wali Karzai’s assassination by trusted guard Mahmad Sardar – a family friend who commanded 200 men himself –Razziq acted quickly to reel in the city’s giddy minds: by afternoon Sardar’s body hung by a rope from the roof of a city center police station.
With the US troop drawdown begun this month, most observers view the loss of “our SOB” in the South – a region declared won as ISAF shifts to the East – as a strategic setback: a metaphorical prison break mirroring the literal prison break of nearly 500 Taliban in Kandahar City in May. Canada’s combat forces abandoned bases in nearby Panjway District last week, for example, having declared the Afghan mission complete, much to the dismay of local leaders. And as Razziq sets his sights on the city's Taliban, a botched high profile police raid on a downtown safehouse this week seems vindication for the late puppet-master.
Yet if it is still a counterinsurgency that ISAF espouses, then the removal of one of Afghanistan’s most corrupt and feared warlords offers a much needed clean slate. It is a fallacy to say, as ISAF often does in hopes of pursuing insurgent “reconciliation,” that most Taliban are driven by grievances rather than ideology: no jobs program can transform people who idolize turban bombers. But the active sympathies of the “auxiliaries” and the drifting loyalties of the “mass base,” to use the terms of departing ISAF Commander General David Petraeus’ COIN manual, are highly reactive to government predations.
While Gen. Petraeus made fighting corruption a priority during his twelve month command, deeply entrenched personality-based patronage networks, such as that of Ahmad Wali Karzai, prevented substantial changes from gaining momentum. Security in provinces like the late Jan Muhammad’s Uruzgan goes to the highest bidder, and is allocated by ISAF’s designated topak salaran (gun-rulers), whether it be his powerful nephew Matiullah Khan, or teenage henchmen of the Provincial Shurah’s pseudo police force: “I am a ‘servant of Afghanistan,’” one of these described his official job title to me.
Furthermore, as Afghan government officials frazzle over higher and higher offices of oversight, personal accountability is harder to pin down than the $10 million of cash leaving Kabul International Airport every day. Last month Afghanistan’s Attorney General blamed “external” actors for protecting corrupt Afghans from prosecution. Still, Afghan self-righteousness is unmerited: this week the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan reported that US efforts to train Afghanistan’s shady central bank in transparency met fierce resistance, culminating in the expulsion of US Treasury advisors in May.
All of this bodes well for the Taliban: A UN survey earlier this year found that 48% of Afghans in the South – where the police count on AWK’s ISAF-proof network for goodies and pardons – have a favorable opinion of the police (slightly above the 40% favorable rating of the Taliban).
This figures, for the twitter-friendly Taliban are doing the jobs the Americans won’t do: targeting the corrupt power-brokers. In COIN, it’s telling who the people blame when insurgents kill civilians (the incidence of which is on the rise, according to a July UN report): a successful progression would be from “blame ISAF,” to “blame the insurgents,” to “blame the
government – it can do better.” But in Kandahar, the hush suggests a collective, “Can you blame ‘em?”Yet as the so-called power vacuum shows, the jury is still out. Thus, it is startling that, presented with an opportunity to defeat the Taliban’s vigilante appeal by holding gun-rulers accountable and rewarding transparency, an international consensus has emerged that now is the opportunity for peace talks. Last month President Karzai confirmed that the US is in negotiations with the Taliban, whom he has called “brothers.” The United Nations, for its part, removed 14 “former” Taliban members from its blacklist last week in hopes of incentivizing talks.
But the opportunity for talks is a mirage. In Kandahar City this week, telecom providers dutifully disabled service precisely due to the Taliban’s desire that no one talk. In neighboring Zabul Province, providers have pleaded a 4-hour morning window out of the Taliban. Doctors at Zabul’s largest hospital have recently begun negotiating their hours as well.
ISAF’s opportunity now, rather, is to turn AWK’s passing into a symbolic turning point in the power-politics of the world’s second most corrupt country. Being perceived to side with the Afghans who are still searching for a decent Taliban alternative is essential for holding the hard-fought gains of the departing troops. Even Kandaharis are puzzled over who will fill the vacuum, but they ought to be assured: Warlords need not apply.
(Photos by Founders' Porch)
