Tuesday, November 29, 2011
Breaking news: Holy Victory! (Source: Taliban in talks with Allah regarding transitional government)
Friday, November 18, 2011
In the graveyard of straight-shooters
US Army Major General Peter Fuller was relieved of his command in Afghanistan earlier this month because, when asked about Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s recent hand-over-heart vow that, “If there is war between Pakistan and America, we will stand by Pakistan,” he called Karzai “erratic” and asked, “Why don’t you just poke me in the eye with a needle! You’ve got to be kidding me.” But what was more surprising than MG Fuller’s reaction – which, if one considers the 1,800 Americans killed protecting Afghanistan, was restrained – was that of a “western diplomat” who, wishing to remain anonymous due to the sensitivity of his statement, observed, “The phraseology could have been better.” In other words, weeks after Joint Chiefs Chairman (Ret.) Michael Mullen’s testimony specifically confirming Pakistani intelligence’s support of the Taliban’s September attack on the US embassy in Kabul killing 25, six months after the US hunt-down of Osama Bin Laden in the Pakistani Army town of Abbottobad, and ten years into a war against a Pakistan-fueled insurgency, criticizing the grammar of a pro-Pakistan statement remains one step outside-the-shade too far for the coalition of the willing.
The firing comes amid revelations about a “secret memo” delivered from Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari to Admiral Mullen last May. The memo called for US support in convincing the ISI to axe its Taliban-training “Section S,” revealing the US’ ongoing courtship of the ISI – a courtship the US plans to continue, judging by Jeffrey Goldberg’s December Atlantic profile “The Ally from Hell,” which ominously concludes with an insider’s assurance that General David H. Petraeus, in his new role as CIA director, will make progress with the ISI because he has “a good personal relationship with these guys.”
Whatever the US position, it has not taken a “secret memo” for Afghans to conclude that Pakistan is at the root of their problems. For most Afghans in Kabul, the target of a startling trend of shopping center attacks this year despite its vaunted “Ring of Steel” security perimeter, “Pakistani” is nearly synonymous with “terrorist.” Even in Pashtun-dominated Kandahar, most Afghans consider the violence – this year has brought the assassination of the provincial police chief, the provincial shurah chief, the Kandahar City mayor, and many district officials – to be a Pakistani export. Southerners rank Pakistani support as one of the top three reasons the Taliban fight, according to an Asia Foundation survey released this month. Shurah leaders in Kandahar and surrounding provinces privately say not only that they believe the ISI is supporting Taliban operations in the south, but that Paksitan will reach further as America exits.
President Karzai’s statement of Pakistani solidarity was, then, meant for Pakistani consumption, not domestic. This reflects an instinctive bow to Pakistani power at a time when the waning US presence was unable to prevent the July assassination of Karzai’s close advisor Jan Mahmad Khan and the September assassination of his nationally-respected Peace Council chief Burhanuddin Rabbani.
But the intended audience of the US’ perennially tame statements on Karzai’s corruption and Pakistan’s subversion (Admiral Mullen’s statement came only after he retired) is less clear. The center of gravity in counterinsurgency, according to Gen Petraeus’ Army field manual, is not external actors but the domestic population. An Afghan population left guessing about US feelings towards the puppet-masters in Pakistan or the corrupt administration in Kabul is more likely to be suspicious of the promises ISAF makes with conviction, particularly regarding the “transition” buzz: as a NATO spokesman assured Afghans this week, “NATO’s combat role will be progressively reduced, but Afghanistan will need support after 2014 and that support will continue.”
Unfortunately, the US’ fixation on institution-building and politicking comes at the expense of Afghans’ trust. MG Fuller was fired for weakening ISAF’s “solid relationship” with the Afghan government, but it is unclear how Afghans, a record 56% of whom reported corruption to be a major problem in daily life in 2011, view anyone boasting affinity with such a dubious bunch. Meanwhile, those who emphasize fixing “AfPak” relations, to use the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke’s tired phrase, overlook the second and third order effects of gaining the grassroots trust of the population: Afghans confident in US intentions, and presented with an apolitical timetable for US withdrawal would be far likelier to stop facilitating the Pakistan Taliban’s presence in Afghanistan. This, coupled with drastic cuts in the US aid given to Pakistan (and, consequently, to the Taliban and radical madrassas via the ISI), would disrupt the flow of insurgents into Afghanistan, not to mention the spill-over of the fundamentalist Deobandi teachings tightening their grip on Afghanistan’s mosques.
Indeed, the diplomats and civilian advisors are as guilty as the military in favoring politics over COIN. Too often, the most cherished metric for evaluating the over $18.8 billion the US has spent on foreign aid in Afghanistan is the “burn rate.” As the June 2011 “Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan” Senate report put it, “Political pressures create perverse incentives to spend money even when the conditions are not right.” The result is a distorted Afghan economy (it is geo-politically taboo to even suggest deregulating Afghanistan’s poppy cash crop) and a looming depression, a preoccupation of many elders at this week’s Kabul “jirga.”
As for civilian advisors, consider the lax COIN metrics of Andrew Exum, an Afghanistan expert at the Center for a New American Strategy, “Washington’s go-to think tank on military affairs,”as the Washington Post has suggested. In July 2009 he said the “11th hour” was at hand, predicting that by August 2010 ISAF would have to be able to demonstrate progress in lowering civilian body counts and increasing security force competence. Yet the percentage of Afghans agreeing that the police force is unprofessional and poorly trained remained a constant 58% in 2010 (dropping to 56% in 2011), and civilian deaths in the first 6 months of each year have increased from 622 in 2009 to 1,167 in 2011. Undaunted, last December Mr. Exum predicted July 2011 would be a COIN “watershed,” when “the unmistakable outlines of progress or deepening evidence of problems will emerge.” Yet as 2012 approaches, any Afghanistan verdict remains murky.
There are some encouraging signs of breaking the political impasse. Last month Afghanistan signed a long-overdue strategic partnership agreement with India, the natural enemy of the Taliban and al Qaeda in the region. This came in the wake of the US’ summer decision to delay payments on hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid and reimbursements to Pakistan. As for the state department, its Afghanistan budget has passed its peak, giving hope that “burn rate” obsessions and million dollar salaries for civilian “technical advisors” will be a thing of the past. Yet with Kabul jirga attendees and an Afghan opposition figure in Washington warning this week of a post-2014 civil war, the US still has a counterinsurgency effort to win. When world leaders convene in Bonn next month to make sense of where Afghanistan goes from here, “phraseology” ought to be the least of their concerns.
Monday, November 14, 2011
How to lose your command in Afghanistan (animated)
Thursday, November 10, 2011
A Merry Little Ramadan
I raised my hands. “Zuh Americayum,” I’m American, I said, wondering whether he was one of the Taliban’s ANP-infiltrators who would not believe his luck.
1:30 am: I wake up to relieve a desperate bladder.
3:30 am: My alarm rings. I plod in flip-flops and basketball shorts to the refrigerator. Muslims wake up before dawn for the day’s first prayer even in Ordinary Time, but in Ramadan it’s followed by a hibernation meal, prepared by the women-folk who have been up since perhaps one. Lacking a Men’s Health Guide to Ramadan, I realize I have no food strategy: some foods, I suppose, might make me hungrier or expand my stomach. I opt for the food pyramid: buttered nan, a melon slice, a spoonful of chopped cucumbers, what appears to be a leftover chicken spinal chord (this is Kandahar), and a piece of Ali Baba’s delicious cocoa-swirl pound cake. I had chugged three more waters (Ramadan, after all, means “scorched”) when out from the mosques there arose such a clatter.
It is widely understood that one is at greatest risk of Ramadan relapse between the hours of 4 and 6 pm. Speech becomes salivaless and precious, resulting in stocatto mumbles, which prompt requests to repeat, ultimately escalating into a scene of irritability and parsimony. Thus, it’s best spent isolated, which in turn brings sinister temptations as the minds turn dark: “But no one will ever know…” Yet I was never able to get a Kandahari to admit to even thinking of cheating. I thought of it quite often, usually justifying it in terms of work efficiency. Luckily I had an antidote. The common nap: relieves hunger, foul moods, and exhaustion, and helps you forget for an hour that you need a saline IV.
Loopholes abound, with the desperate ones calling it from the lowest possible vantage. But when you’re within listening distance of a mosque, you wait for the mullah’s verdict. At this point, I felt lightweight and giddy, my appetite slightly fading. Then came the old man’s familiar tarzanish call to prayer. But this time it was beautiful – perhaps in an unhealthy, Stockholm Syndrome kind-of-way – but beautiful still, especially knowing that the generous cantor, to whom I felt allied for the first time, was delaying his own break to allow us ours. The water hit me like an endorphin cocktail. The pound cake, which I took first, was like a “special” brownie, making everything seem pleasant. These Muslims might be on to something.
The highlight of the following two weeks was my time conversing at Iftar with the two twenty-something compound-hands: Mashal, a posh Dari-speaking Kabuli with a “Broken Angel” ringtone, who wears a sleeveless soccer shirt over his Pashtun capri pants and can usually be found updating his facebook status with a “missing u still!!! :(((” for his Kabul girlfriends with Indian actress profile pics. And Jafar, a goofy-faced, gullible, kind, 6’4” Pashtun, born-and-raised in Kandahar City, often rendered incoherent by Mashal’s unsure translations of his Pashto. They prepared true Iftar meals – which start with eating some dates and end with lots of melons and oil-with-rice – and were eager to talk to the foreigner.
Mashal: The fucking Taliban man. They fucking ruin everything man.
Kabir: (wild-eyed, trying his English): They are junglemen!
Me: What?
Kabir: Junglemen!
Mashal: He means, they are wild, like people in the jungle. All of our problems are the fucking Pashtuns.
Kabir: (smiles sheepishly).
Mashal: And Pakistan. And Iranian. And Russian.
Mashal: Yeah man, fucking Taliban. In Kabul it’s not like this. We are listening to music, the girls are not covered, we are even drinking. I am telling my girlfriends, ‘give me head.’
Me: (eager to validate a flowering classical liberal) Nice.
Kabir: (smiling, not understanding).
Mashal: How is America? There is a girl in America that wants to marry me so I can come there. She is from Kuh-something.
Me: Colorado?
Mashal: (pulls up her facebook profile: a 40-something Kentucky carnie, balding and jack-toothed).
Me: Oh Kentucky. Yeah, Kentucky is kind of like our Paktiya. Mountain people, you know.
Kabir: (upon hearing the translation) Woooow. Kentucky.
I had a 5:15 pm flight to Egypt via Dubai. I had had two beers the previous night and missed my 3:30 am wakeup, so I was thirsty. I sat next to a non-English-speaking Jalalabad Pashtun. We were traveling west, so Iftar would be delayed (some say that simply sitting in a top-floor Dubai Tower office adds three minutes to your Iftar). The stewardess handed out special box meals of dates and water to be stowed until sun-down. I asked for one. “Are you Muslim?” “No, but I’m fasting.” “Really?” Pleasantly surprised, she handed it over. Eventually, an older man, satisfied with the sunset, dug in, followed rapidly by others. To my horror, Jalalabad Dimmesdale put down his prayer beads to wag a finger at me. After ten minutes I ask him to reassess. He approved, and we had our dates and water. Then he pulled out a peach from some mysterious stash and gave me half. No grimy half-peach had ever meant so much to me, and I thanked him for his Ramadan charity.
Ramadan in Egypt: I arrive in Alexandria too late for a proper meal. I spend the following Iftar with a cab driver in the airport parking lot, where I am waiting to retrieve a lost bag. The next day, having found the bag and forgiven the airline (‘tis the season), I continue to Israel via Cairo, where my 3 hour bus-layover gives me a chance to stroll the bustling tea-alleys near Tahrir Square. An Egyptian family eagerly invites me to join them for a generous Iftar of dates, chicken, and rice. The teens next to me brag about having fought Mubarak’s police months earlier.
Ramadan in Israel: I’ve heard it said by mischievous Muslim-American friends, “Allah does not see what happens in Las Vegas.” If that’s so, then he probably does not watch over the “Zionist entity” either. Still, I must now confess: on Day 15, having lost ten pounds on the Ramadan diet, I eliminated myself from the Ramadan Challenge with a falafel. But it was damn good falafel. As it turns out, summer in party-hard 24/7 Tel Aviv presents a unique Ramadan challenge due to its many temptations: this is one of the few cities, for example, where the daylight romance clause cannot be taken lightly. Glimpsing a few Israeli Muslims during my trip as I ate falafels, I felt like Cool Hand Luke on-the-run, destined to soon return to them, my prison-mates.
Back in Kandahar with a week to go, I resumed the fast. By now, thanks to my nightly studies, I was well versed on the posthumous torments awaiting infidels such as me: For the Infidels we have got ready chains and collars and flaming fire…We will brand him on the nostrils…Then pour on his head the tormenting boiling water… And thereupon shall ye drink boiling water. Tea, anyone? The Koran, I’d concluded, was a nightmare from which few Kandaharis were trying to awake.
Prayer value inflates dramatically over the final three days of Ramadan. Friday was “Quds Day,” so I asked the staff about praying at the mosque. Amin, eager to collect my bounty perhaps, consented. Noor was grave: “They will ask you if you are Muslim. They will ask, ‘why don’t you know how to kneel and pray like us?’ That is not good for you.” Amin offered to teach me the basics, noting that the whole world will become Muslim by 2013 anyway according to science. I yielded to Noor.
Saturday was Lailat-ul-Qadar. As my morning security text put it: “You are advised to stay more alert tonight and tomorrow than the previous times, due to the 27th of Ramadan which all people do not sleep on this special night continuing prayin and reciting the holly Quran, might insurgents use this opportunity for their target execution.” Indeed, two suicide bombs shook our office that afternoon, with Iran’s Press TV giddily reporting 64 Americans killed (the toll was actually 4 Afghans). The next day, I asked the staffers if they had stayed up all night reciting. Amin gushed that yes it was wonderful. Noor, for his part, had successfully watched John Cena until 2 am, and then fallen asleep.
Finally, the morning of Eid-al-Fitr (literally, “Festive breaking of the fast”). The compound was quiet, the staffers home celebrating three days of “picnics” (the Kandahar euphemism for parties), and Ali Baba off to his native Ghazni Province, having stocked the fridge with a lifetime supply of sheep’s organs. Yet it felt obscene to eat even a grape, so I went out to the gruff custodian Khaliq, who confirmed via translator that on Eid, it is haram not to consume. Khaliq, who has placed a flower sprig in his ear, is slurring his words and balancing his eyes, for this is his first full day since July of naswar, the rank, olive-colored powder placed on the gum like a tobacco pinch, but with ten times the effect. "It is Eid!" he reiterates with a finger in the air.
Even the most protective staffers had told me that on Eid I could take my Chinese bike anywhere, as no one would fight on that joyous day. To my surprise, the streets had been transformed into a block party of gaudily-crowned urchins in diamond studded shalwar kameeses and priestly jerkins, all heavily armed with RPGs, AKs, and klobbs. On closer inspection, these were just “toy” guns, the Tickle-me-Elmo’s of Eid-in-Kandahar. Sons were gathered with fathers near the mosques, reminding me of Salman Rushdie’s “Snotnose” Sinai, who rarely prayed, “except on Eid-ul-Fitr, when my father took me to the Friday mosque to celebrate the holiday by tying a handkerchief around my head and pressing my forehead to the ground.” In one bustling market, giant subs were blaring tunes, and even the women in their new exactly-the-same burkas looked like they might be smiling under their veils.