Wednesday, July 11, 2012

Waiting for their man


For war-weary Central Americans, a drug deal never took so long... (Published at The Daily Caller)

Guatemalans esperando un milagro. (Founders' Porch)
The Obama administration’s foreign policy is often criticized for its perceived post-American internationalism, but US drug policy suggests that the all-American realism of days past lives on.  Consider the perspective, for example, of Special UN envoy Kofi Annan. Last week he cleared up any confusion about the international community’s efforts to orally persuade Syria’s dictatorship to stop being a dictatorship, explaining, “The evidence shows that we have not succeeded.” Yet meanwhile, over a year after Annan called on the US to consider drug legalizations in a Global Commission on Drug Policy Report, evidence such as lectures by the US drug czar to Central American leaders shows that when it comes to the War on Drugs, the international community has been no less unsuccessful in changing the mind of the leader of the international community itself.

"Making drugs more available,” US drug czar Gil Kerlikowske said last year, “will make it harder to keep our communities healthy and safe.” This Panglossian optimism must puzzle people in Central America, where there are less and less communities to “keep” safe. Indeed, the homicide rates per 100,000 people have risen over the last decade in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras to 41, 66, and 82 (the world’s highest) respectively, with the US “healthy” indeed at less than 5. The discovery of 49 bodies on a Mexican highway one morning last May is only one of the more recent reminders of the viciousness of this best of all possible drug wars, most of those bodies going unidentified because of “the lack of heads, hands, and feet.” Just last weekend exasperated protestors marched against the drug-fueled insecurity and impunity in Guatemala, “a good place to commit murder, because you will almost certainly get away with it,” as one UN official has described this drug-corridor state.

DEA Administrator Michele Leonhart put it more bluntly last month in congressional testimony when she called the “antidrug mission” an “essential element to the national health and security of the U.S. and interests abroad.” Certainly it is an essential element to the DEA’s budgetary health, but the interests of our Latin American allies seem not to have made the cut. For their part, a generation of pro-legalization leaders has finally found their voice: The presidents of both Colombia and Costa Rica have floated legalization in recent months, and Guatemala’s newly elected President Otto Perez Molina openly supports legalization, even at the cost of significant political capital. Yet when he spoke out boldly against the Drug War at Latin America’s World Economic Forum last April, he found his once like-minded counter-parts from El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua had jumped ship, a consequence (Cato’s Juan Carlos Hidalgo speculates) of US pressure. With Mexico’s newly-elected president on the fence, this is one time when US leadership from behind would be preferable.

History, however, has taught Central Americans to be cautious of US leadership. Guatemalans remember that in 1954, our regional “interests” meant installing a dictatorship, setting the stage for decades of atrocities which a 1999 international commission would walk back to US meddling. Yet ironically, the violence of this era, during which the US illegally blocked regional weapons shipments, is a fraction of today’s violence, to which the US actually injects weapons with its either corrupt or embarrassingly incompetent ATF programs.

They weep for legalization. (Founders' Porch)
Rather than seize the opportunity to reset this history, the US has doubled-down, and not just on drugs: not content with lecturing Arizona on how to handle Drug War insecurity, the US is threatening commercial penalties against Guatemala unless it rewrites its very constitution to expand worker protections.  This would seem to contradict the premise behind USDA programs, such as McGovern-Dole, which provide monthly food rations for Guatemalan families (often those which cannot afford the compliance costs of joining the co-ops that serve Americans’ fine taste for the organic) who send their working children to school: Guatemala does not face a values crisis, goes the thinking, but an economic one. Yet the prevailing premise of US policy in the region is summed up by Kerlikowske’s axiom: “criminals won’t disappear if we legalize drugs.”

One wonders if a nation $15.8 trillion in debt has the luxury to be funding strategically contradictory programs.  Does USDA sync with DEA? Maybe not, but DEA certainly talks with SOD and CNTOC, and sometimes cross-checks with ATF, and fuses with OCDDETF, which syncs with SICA. Though even then, as Fast and Furious has shown, Mexico gets left in the dark, and every border killing leaves US agents terrified of a bureaucratic miscommunication a la George Tenet after 9/11: “I wonder if it has anything to do with this guy taking pilot training.”

For an administration so wary of blowback when it comes to standing by Iranian protestors or merely green-lighting a Turkish humanitarian corridor in Syria, it might think twice about the consequences of a perceived imperial drug policy. When the masses begin chanting “Fuera DEA,” the inescapable irony will be that self-interested realism was never in US interest at all. Political interests are another story, which makes New Jersey governor Chris Christie’s risky statement in support of reforming drug policy earlier this week particularly welcome. Perhaps this is a road best paved by the politically buffered, such as former presidents. But Central America’s leaders are ready now, and we ought not keep them waiting.